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Abstract
A dominant approach to solving large imperfect-information games is Counter-
factural Regret Minimization (CFR). In CFR, many regret minimization problems
are combined to solve the game. For very large games, abstraction is typically
needed to render CFR tractable. Abstractions are often manually tuned, possi-
bly removing important strategic differences in the full game and harming per-
formance. Function approximation provides a natural solution to finding good
abstractions to approximate the full game. A common approach to incorporating
function approximation is to learn the inputs needed for a regret minimizing al-
gorithm, allowing for generalization across many regret minimization problems.
This paper gives regret bounds when a regret minimizing algorithm uses estimates
instead of true values. This form of analysis is the first to generalize to a larger
class of (Φ, f)-regret matching algorithms, and includes different forms of regret
such as swap, internal, and external regret. We demonstrate how these results give
a slightly tighter bound for Regression Regret-Matching (RRM), and present a
novel bound for combining regression with Hedge.
1 Introduction
The dominant framework for approximatingNash equilibria in extensive-formgames with imperfect
information is Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), and it has successfully been used to solve
and expertly play human-scale poker games [1, 2, 3, 4]. This framework is built on the idea of
decomposing a game into a network of simple regret minimizers [5, 6]. For very large games,
abstraction is typically used to reduce the size and yield a strategically similar game that is feasible
to solve with CFR [5, 7, 8, 9].
Function approximation is a natural generalization of abstraction. In CFR, this amounts to estimating
the regrets for each regret minimizer instead of storing them all in a table [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15].
Function approximation can be competitive with domain specific state abstraction [10, 11, 12], and
in some cases is able to outperform tabular CFR without abstraction if the players are optimizing
against their best responses [14].
Combining regression and regret-minimization with applications to CFR was initially studied by
Waugh et. al. [10], introducing the RRM theorem—giving a sufficient condition for function ap-
proximator error to still achieve no external regret. In this paper we generalize the RRM theorem to
a larger class of regret-minimizers and Φ-regret—a set of regret metrics that include external regret,
internal regret, and swap regret. Extending to a larger class of regret-minimizers provides insight
into the effectiveness of combining function approximation and regret minimization—the effect of
function approximation error on the bounds will vary between algorithms. Furthermore, extending
to other algorithms can give theory for existing or future methods. For example, there has been in-
terest in a functional version of hedge, an algorithm within the studied class, for general multiagent
Preprint. Under review.
and non-stationary settings that can outperform softmax policy gradient methods [13]. Extending
to a more general class of regret metrics such as internal regret allows for potentially-novel applica-
tions of regret minimization and function approximation including finding an approximate correlated
equilibrium [16].
2 Preliminaries
We adopt the notation from Greenwald et al. [17] to describe an online decision problem (ODP).
An ODP consists of a set of possible actions A and set of possible rewards R. In this paper we
assume a finite set of actions and bounded1 R ⊂ R+ where supR = U . The tuple (A,R) fully
characterizes the problem and is referred to as a reward system. Furthermore, let Π denote the set of
reward functions r : A 7→ R.
At each round t an agent selects a distribution over actions qt ∈ ∆(A)2, samples an action at ∼ qt
and then receives the reward function rt ∈ Π. The agent is able to compute the rewards for actions
that were not taken at time t in contrast to the bandit setting where the agent only observes rt(at).
Crucially, each rt is allowed to be selected arbitrarily fromΠ. As a consequence, this ODP model is
flexible enough to encompass multi-agent, adversarial interactions, and game theoretic equilibrium
concepts even though it is described from the perspective of a single agent’s decisions.
A learning algorithm in an ODP selects qt using information from the history of observations and
actions previously taken. We denote this information at time t as historyt h ∈ Ht := At × Πt,
where H0 := {∅}. Formally, an online learning algorithm is a sequence of functions {Lt}∞t=1,
where Lt : Ht−1 7→ ∆(A).
2.1 Action Transformations
To generalize the analysis to different forms of regret (e.g. swap, internal, and external regret), it is
useful to define action transformations. Action transformations are functions of the form φ : A 7→
∆(A), giving a distribution over actions for each action input. Let ΦALL := ΦALL(A) denote the
set of all action transformations for the set of actions A and ΦSWAP := ΦSWAP (A) the set of all
action transformations with codomain as the set of all pure strategies for action set A.
Two important subsets of ΦSWAP are ΦEXT and ΦINT . ΦEXT denotes the set of all external
transformations—the set of constant action transformations in ΦSWAP . More formally, if δa ∈
∆(A) is the distribution with full weight on action a, then ΦEXT = {φ : ∃y ∈ A∀x ∈ A φ(x) =
δy}.
ΦINT consists of the set of all possible internal transformations for action set A, where an internal
transformation from action a to action b is defined as φ
(a,b)
INT (x) = δb if x = a, φ
(a,b)
INT (x) = δx
otherwise.
We have that |ΦSWAP | = |A||A|,ΦEXT = |A|, |ΦINT | = |A|2 − |A|+ 1 [17].
We will also make use of the linear transformation [φ] : ∆(A) 7→ ∆(A) defined as [φ](q) =∑
a∈A q(a)φ(a).
2.2 Regret
For a given action transformationφwe can compute the difference in expected reward for a particular
action and reward function. This expected difference, known as φ-regret, is denoted by ρφ(a, r) =
Es∼φ(a)[r(s)] − r(a). For a set of action transformations Φ, the Φ-regret vector is ρ
Φ(a, r) =
(ρφ(a, r))φ∈Φ. Note the expected value of φ-regret if the agent chooses q ∈ ∆(A) is Ea∼q[ρφ(a, r)].
For an ODP with observed history h at time t, with reward functions {rs}ts=1 and actions {as}
t
s=1,
the cumulative Φ-regret for time t and action transformations Φ is RΦt (h) =
∑t
s=1 ρ
Φ(as, rs). For
brevity we will omit the h argument, and for convenience we set RΦ0 = 0. Note that R
Φ
t is a random
1The restriction of positive rewards is without loss of generality and is only used for convenience.
2∆(A) is the set of all probability distributions over actions in A.
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vector, and we seek to bound
E
[
1
t
max
φ∈Φ
Rφt
]
. (1)
ChoosingΦEXT ,ΦINT ,ΦSWAP for (1) amounts to minimizing external regret, internal regret, and
swap regret respectively. One can also change (1) by interchanging the max and the expectation. In
RRM, max
φ∈Φ
E
[
1
tR
φ
t
]
is bounded [10, 11], however, bounds for (1) still apply [17, Corollary 18].
3 Approximate Regret-Matching
Given a set of action transformations Φ and a link function f : R|Φ| 7→ R
|Φ|
+ that is subgradient to
a convex potential functionG : R|Φ| 7→ R, where RN+ denotes the N -dimensional positive orthant
3,
we can define a general class of online learning algorithms known as (Φ, f)-regret-matching algo-
rithms [17]. A (Φ, f)-regret-matching algorithm at time t chooses q ∈ ∆(A) that is a fixed point4
of Mt =
∑
φ∈Φ
Y φt [φ]/
∑
φ∈Φ
Y φt where Y
Φ
t = (Y
φ
t )φ∈Φ = f(R
Φ
t−1) when R
Φ
t−1 ∈ R
|Φ|
+ \ {0} and
arbitrarily otherwise. If Φ = ΦEXT then the fixed point of Mt is a distribution q ∝ Y Φt [20]. Ex-
amples of (Φ, f)-regret-matching algorithms include Hart’s algorithm [18]–typically called “regret-
matching” or the polynomial weighted average forecaster [16]–and Hedge [19]–the exponentially
weighted average forecaster [16], with link functions f(x)i = (x
+
i )
p−1 for p ≥ 1, and f(x)i = eηxi
with parameter η > 0, respectively.
A useful technique to bounding regret when estimates are used in place of true values is to define an
ǫ−Blackwell condition, as was used in the RRM theorem [10]. The analysis in RRM was specific
to Φ = ΦEXT and the polynomial link f with p = 2. To generalize across different link functions
and Φ ⊆ ΦALL we define the (Φ, f, ǫ)-Blackwell condition.
Definition 1 ((Φ, f, ǫ)-Blackwell Condition). For a given reward system (A,R), finite set of action
transformations Φ ⊆ ΦALL, and link function f : R|Φ| 7→ R
|Φ|
+ , a learning algorithm satisfies the
(Φ, f, ǫ)-Blackwell condition with value ǫ if f(RΦt−1(h)) · Ea∼Lt(h)[ρ
Φ(a, r)] ≤ ǫ.
The Regret Matching Theorem [17] shows that the (Φ, f)-Blackwell condition (ǫ = 0) holds with
equality for (Φ, f)-regret-matching algorithms for any finite set of action transformationsΦ and link
function f .
We seek to bound objective (1) when an algorithm at time t chooses the fixed point of M˜t =
∑
φ∈Φ
Y˜ φt [φ]/
∑
φ∈Φ Y˜
φ
t , when R˜
Φ
t−1 ∈ R
|Φ|
+ \ {0} and arbitrarily otherwise, where Y˜
Φ
t = f(R˜
Φ
t−1)
and R˜Φt−1 is an estimate of R
Φ
t−1, possibly from a function approximator. Such an algorithm is
referred to as approximate (Φ, f)-regret-matching.
Similarly to the RRM theorem [10, 11], we show that the ǫ parameter of the (Φ, f, ǫ)-Blackwell
condition depends on the error in approximating the exact link outputs, ‖Y Φt − Y˜
Φ
t ‖1.
Theorem 1. Given reward system (A,R), a finite set of action transformations Φ ⊆ ΦALL, and
link function f : R|Φ| 7→ R
|Φ|
+ , then an approximate (Φ, f )-regret-matching algorithm, {Lt}
∞
t=1,
satisfies the (Φ, f, ǫ)-Blackwell Condition with ǫ ≤ 2U‖Y Φt − Y˜
Φ
t ‖1, where Y
Φ
t = f(R
Φ
t−1), and
Y˜ Φt = f(R˜
Φ
t−1).
All proofs are deferred to the appendix.
For a (Φ, f)-regret-matching algorithm, an approach to bounding (1) is to use the (Φ, f)-Blackwell
condition and provide a bound onE[G(RΦt )] for an appropriate potential functionG [17, 16]. Bound-
ing the regret (1) for an approximate (Φ, f)-regret-matching algorithm will be done similarly, except
the bound on ǫ from Theorem 1 will be used. Proceeding in this fashion yields the following theorem:
3 Note that as long asG is bounded from above on the negative orthant then the codomain of f is the positive
orthant.
4Note that sinceMt is a linear operator over the simplex∆(A), the fixed point always exists by the Brouwer
fixed point theorem.
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Theorem 2. Given a real-valued reward system (A,R) a finite set Φ ⊆ ΦALL of action transfor-
mations. If 〈G, g, γ〉 is a Gordon triple5, then an approximate (Φ, g)-regret-matching algorithm
{Lt}∞t=1 guarantees at all times t ≥ 0
E[G(RΦt )] ≤ G(0) + t sup
a∈A,r∈Π
γ(ρΦ(a, r)) + 2U
t∑
s=1
‖g(RΦs−1)− g(R˜
Φ
s−1)‖1.
4 Bounds
4.1 Polynomial Link
Given the polynomial link function f(x)i = (x
+
i )
p−1 we consider two cases 2 < p < ∞ and 1 <
p ≤ 2. For the following results it is useful to denote the maximal activation µ(Φ) = maxa∈A|{φ ∈
Φ : φ(a) 6= δa}| [17].
For the case p > 2 we have the following bound on (1).
Theorem 3. Given an ODP, a finite set of action transformations Φ ⊆ ΦALL, and the polynomial
link function f with p > 2, then an approximate (Φ, f)- regret-matching algorithm guarantees
E
[
max
φ∈Φ
1
t
Rφt
]
≤
1
t
√√√√t(p− 1)U2(µ(Φ))2/p + 2U t∑
k=1
‖g(RΦk−1)− g(R˜
Φ
k−1)‖1
where g : R|Φ| 7→ R
|Φ|
+ and g(x)i = 0 if xi ≤ 0 otherwise g(x)i =
2(xi)
p−1
‖x+‖p−2p
.
Similarly for the case 1 < p ≤ 2 we have the following.
Theorem 4. Given an ODP, a finite set of action transformations Φ ⊆ ΦALL, and the polynomial
link function f with 1 < p ≤ 2, then an approximate (Φ, f)- regret-matching algorithm guarantees
E
[
max
φ∈Φ
1
t
Rφt
]
≤
1
t
(
tUpµ(Φ) + 2U
t∑
k=1
‖g(RΦk−1)− g(R˜
Φ
k−1)‖1
)1/p
where g : R|Φ| 7→ R
|Φ|
+ and g(x)i = p(x
+
i )
p−1.
In comparison to the RRM theorem [11], the above bound is tighter as there is no
√
|A| term in front
of the errors and the |A| term has been replaced by6 |A| − 1. These improvements are due to the
tighter bound in Theorem 1 and the original Φ-regret analysis [17], respectively. Aside from these
differences, the bounds coincide.
4.2 Exponential Link
Theorem 5. Given an ODP, a finite set of action transformations Φ ⊆ ΦALL, and an exponential
link function f(x)i = e
ηxi with η > 0, then an approximate (Φ, f)- regret-matching algorithm
guarantees
E
[
max
φ∈Φ
1
t
Rφt
]
≤
1
t
(
ln|Φ|
η
+ 2U
t∑
k=1
‖g(RΦk−1)− g(R˜
Φ
k−1)‖1
)
+
ηU2
2
where g : R|Φ| 7→ R
|Φ|
+ and g(x)i = e
ηxi/
∑
j e
ηxj .
The Hedge algorithm corresponds to the exponential link function f(x)i = e
ηxi when Φ = ΦEXT ,
so Theorem 5 provides a bound on a regression Hedge algorithm. Note that in this case, the ap-
proximation error term is not inside a root function as it is under the polynomial link function. This
seems to imply that at the level of link outputs, polynomial link functions have a better dependence
on the approximation errors. However, g in the exponential link function bound is normalized to the
simplex while the polynomial link functions can take on larger values. So which link function has a
better dependence on the approximation errors depends on the magnitude of the cumulative regrets,
which depends on the environment and the algorithm’s empirical performance.
5See definition 2 in appendix.
6For Φ = ΦEXT , µ(Φ) = |A| − 1.
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Appendices
Below we recall results from Greenwald et. al.[17] and include the detailed proofs omitted in the
main body of the paper.
Many of the following results make use of a Gordon triple. We restate the definition fromGreenwald
et. al. below.
Definition 2. A Gordon triple 〈G, g, γ〉 consists of three functionsG : Rn 7→ R, g : Rn 7→ Rn, and
γ : Rn 7→ R such that for all x, y ∈ Rn, G(x+ y) ≤ G(x) + g(x) · y + γ(y).
A Existing Results
Lemma 1. If x is a random vector that takes values in Rn, then (E[maxix])
q ≤ E[‖x+‖qp] for
p, q ≥ 1.
See [Lemma 21][17].
Lemma 2. Given a reward system (A,R) and a finite set of action transformations Φ ⊆ ΦALL,
then ‖ρΦ(a, r)‖p ≤ U(µ(Φ))1/p for any reward function r ∈ Π.
The proof is indentical to [Lemma 22][17] except we have that regrets are bounded in [−U,U ]
instead of [−1, 1]. Also note that by assumptionR is bounded.
Theorem 6 (Gordon 2005). Assume 〈G, g, γ〉 is a Gordon triple andC : N 7→ R. LetX0 ∈ Rn, let
x1, x2, ... be a sequence of random vectors over R
n, and defineXt = Xt−1+xt for all times t ≥ 1.
If for all times t ≥ 1,
g(Xt−1) · E[xt|Xt−1] + E[γ(xt)|Xt−1] ≤ C(t) a.s.
then, for all times t ≥ 0,
E[G(Xt)] ≤ G(X0) +
t∑
τ=1
C(τ).
It should be noted that the above theorem was originally proved by Gordon [21].
6
B Proofs
Theorem 1. Given reward system (A,R), a finite set of action transformations Φ ⊆ ΦALL, and
link function f : R|Φ| 7→ R
|Φ|
+ , then an approximate (Φ, f )-regret-matching algorithm, {Lt}
∞
t=1,
satisfies the (Φ, f, ǫ)-Blackwell Condition with ǫ ≤ 2U‖Y Φt − Y˜
Φ
t ‖1, where Y
Φ
t = f(R
Φ
t−1), and
Y˜ Φt = f(R˜
Φ
t−1).
Proof. We denote r = (r′(a))a∈A as the reward vector for an arbitrary reward function r
′ : A 7→ R.
Since by construction this algorithm chooses Lt at each timestep t to be the fixed point of M˜t,
all that remains to be shown is that this algorithm satisfies the (Φ, f, ǫ)-Blackwell condition with
ǫ ≤ 2U‖Y Φt − Y˜
Φ
t ‖1, t > 0.
By expanding the value of interest in the (Φ, f)-Blackwell condition and applying elementary upper
bounds, we arrive at the desired bound. For simplicity, we omit timestep indices and set L := Lt(h).
First, suppose
∑
φ∈Φ Y˜
Φ
t 6= 0:
Y Φ · Ea∼L[ρ
Φ(a, r)] =
∑
φ∈Φ
Y φ(r · [φ](L)− r · L)
= r ·

∑
φ∈Φ
Y φ[φ]L− L

 . By adding and subtracting Y˜ Φ,
= r ·

∑
φ∈Φ
(Y˜ φ − Y˜ φ + Y φ)([φ](L)− L)

 . By expanding, as well as multiplying and dividing by (∑
φ∈Φ
Y˜ φ),
= r ·

(∑
φ∈Φ
Y˜ φ)
∑
φ∈Φ
M˜L− L+
∑
φ∈Φ
(Y φ − Y˜ φ)([φ](L) − L)

 . Since L is a fixed point of M˜ ,
= r ·

∑
φ∈Φ
(Y φ − Y˜ φ)([φ](L) − L)

 . By the generalized Cauchy-Schwarz inequality [22, 23],
≤ ‖r‖∞‖
∑
φ∈Φ
(Y φ − Y˜ φ)([φ](L)− L)‖1
≤ ‖r‖∞
∑
φ∈Φ
|Y φ − Y˜ φ|(‖[φ](L)‖1 + ‖L‖1). Since [φ](L) and L are both distributions,
≤ ‖r‖∞
∑
φ∈Φ
|Y φ − Y˜ φ|(1 + 1)
≤ 2U‖Y Φ − Y˜ Φ‖1.
If
∑
φ∈Φ Y˜
Φ = 0 it is easy to see the inequality still holds.
Therefore, {Lt}∞t=1 satisfies the (Φ, f, ǫ)-Blackwell condition with ǫ ≤ 2U‖Y
Φ−Y˜ Φ‖1, as required
to complete the argument.
An important observation of Theorem 1 is the following corollary:
Corollary 1. For a reward system (A,R), finite set of action transformations Φ ⊆ ΦALL, and
two link functions f and f ′, if there exists a strictly positive function ψ : R|Φ| 7→ R such that
f ′(x) = ψ(x)f(x) then for any ǫ ∈ R, then an approximate (Φ, f)-regret-matching algorithm
satisfies
f ′(RΦt−1(h)) · Ea∼Lt(h)[ρ
Φ(a, r)] ≤ 2U‖f ′(RΦt−1)− f
′(R˜Φt−1)‖1.
Proof. The reasoning is similar to [Lemma 20][17]. The played fixed point is the same under both
link functions, thus following the same steps to Theorem 1 provides the above bound.
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Theorem 2. Given a real-valued reward system (A,R) a finite set Φ ⊆ ΦALL of action transfor-
mations. If 〈G, g, γ〉 is a Gordon triple7, then an approximate (Φ, g)-regret-matching algorithm
{Lt}∞t=1 guarantees at all times t ≥ 0
E[G(RΦt )] ≤ G(0) + t sup
a∈A,r∈Π
γ(ρΦ(a, r)) + 2U
t∑
s=1
‖g(RΦs−1)− g(R˜
Φ
s−1)‖1.
Proof. The proof is similar to [Corollary 7][17] except that the learning algorithm is playing
the approximate fixed point with respect to the link function g. From Theorem 1 we have
g(RΦt−1(h)) ·Ea∼Lt(h)[ρ
Φ(a, r)] ≤ 2U‖g(RΦt−1)− g(R˜
Φ
t−1)‖1. Noticing that Ea∼Lt(h)[ρ
Φ(a, r)] =
E[ρΦ(a, r)|RΦt−1] and taking xt = ρ
Φ(a, r), Xt = R
Φ
t we have
g(Xt−1) · E[xt|Xt−1] + E[γ(xt)|Xt−1] ≤ 2U‖g(R
Φ
t−1)− g(R˜
Φ
t−1)‖1 + sup
a∈A,r∈Π
γ(ρΦ(a, r)).
The result directly follows from Theorem 6 by taking C(τ) = 2U‖g(RΦτ−1) − g(R˜
Φ
τ−1)‖1 +
sup
a∈A,r∈Π
γ(ρΦ(a, r)).
Theorem 3. Given an ODP, a finite set of action transformations Φ ⊆ ΦALL, and the polynomial
link function f with p > 2, then an approximate (Φ, f)- regret-matching algorithm guarantees
E
[
max
φ∈Φ
1
t
Rφt
]
≤
1
t
√√√√t(p− 1)U2(µ(Φ))2/p + 2U t∑
k=1
‖g(RΦk−1)− g(R˜
Φ
k−1)‖1
where g : R|Φ| 7→ R
|Φ|
+ and g(x)i = 0 if xi ≤ 0 otherwise g(x)i =
2(xi)
p−1
‖x+‖p−2p
.
Proof. The proof follows closely to [Theorem 9][17]. Taking G(x) = ‖x+‖2p and γ(x) = (p −
1)‖x‖2p then 〈G, g, γ〉 is a Gordon triple [17]. Given the above gordon triple we have(
E
[
max
φ∈Φ
Rφt
])2
≤ E[‖(RΦt )
+‖]2p (2)
= E[G(RΦt )] (3)
≤ G(0) + t sup
a∈A,r∈Π
γ(ρΦ(a, r)) + 2U
t∑
s=1
‖g(RΦs−1)− g(R˜
Φ
s−1)‖1 (4)
≤ G(0) + t(p− 1)U2(µ(Φ))2/p + 2U
t∑
k=1
‖g(RΦk−1)− g(R˜
Φ
k−1)‖1 (5)
The first inequality is from Lemma 1. The second inequality follows from Corollary 1 and theorem
2. The third inequality is an application of Lemma 2. The result then immediately follows.
Theorem 4. Given an ODP, a finite set of action transformations Φ ⊆ ΦALL, and the polynomial
link function f with 1 < p ≤ 2, then an approximate (Φ, f)- regret-matching algorithm guarantees
E
[
max
φ∈Φ
1
t
Rφt
]
≤
1
t
(
tUpµ(Φ) + 2U
t∑
k=1
‖g(RΦk−1)− g(R˜
Φ
k−1)‖1
)1/p
where g : R|Φ| 7→ R
|Φ|
+ and g(x)i = p(x
+
i )
p−1.
7See definition 2 in appendix.
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Proof. The proof follows closely to [Theorem 11][17]. Taking G(x) = ‖x+‖pp and γ(x) = (p −
1)‖x‖pp then 〈G, g, γ〉 is a Gordon triple [17]. Given the above Gordon triple we have(
E
[
max
φ∈Φ
Rφt
])p
≤ E[‖(RΦt )
+‖]pp (6)
= E[G(RΦt )] (7)
≤ G(0) + t sup
a∈A,r∈Π
γ(ρΦ(a, r)) + 2U
t∑
s=1
‖g(RΦs−1)− g(R˜
Φ
s−1)‖1 (8)
≤ G(0) + tUp(µ(Φ)) + 2U
t∑
k=1
‖g(RΦk−1)− g(R˜
Φ
k−1)‖1 (9)
The first inequality is from Lemma 1. The second inequality follows from Corollary 1 and theorem
2. The third inequality is an application of Lemma 2. The result then immediately follows.
Theorem 5. Given an ODP, a finite set of action transformations Φ ⊆ ΦALL, and an exponential
link function f(x)i = e
ηxi with η > 0, then an approximate (Φ, f)- regret-matching algorithm
guarantees
E
[
max
φ∈Φ
1
t
Rφt
]
≤
1
t
(
ln|Φ|
η
+ 2U
t∑
k=1
‖g(RΦk−1)− g(R˜
Φ
k−1)‖1
)
+
ηU2
2
where g : R|Φ| 7→ R
|Φ|
+ and g(x)i = e
ηxi/
∑
j e
ηxj .
Proof. The proof follows closely to [Theorem 13][17]. Taking G(x) = 1η ln (
∑
i e
ηxi) and γ(x) =
η
2‖x‖
2
∞ then 〈G, g, γ〉 is a Gordon triple [17]. Given the above Gordon triple we have
E
[
max
φ∈Φ
ηRφt
]
= E
[
ln e
max
φ∈Φ
ηRφt
]
(10)
= E
[
ln max
φ∈Φ
eηR
φ
t
]
(11)
≤ E

ln ∑
φ∈Φ
eηR
φ
t

 (12)
= ηE[G(RΦt )] (13)
≤ η
(
G(0) + t sup
a∈A,r∈Π
γ(ρΦ(a, r)) + 2U
t∑
s=1
‖g(RΦs−1)− g(R˜
Φ
s−1)‖1
)
(14)
≤ η
(
G(0) + t
η
2
U2 + 2U
t∑
s=1
‖g(RΦs−1)− g(R˜
Φ
s−1)‖1
)
(15)
The second inequality follows from Corollary 1 and theorem 2. The result then immediately follows.
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